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Concluding observations: three core themes 
 
 
 
1. Introduction to the core concluding themes  
 
The aim to achieve a high level of environmental protection concerns a complex, wide 
domain that for example encompasses issues related to water, air, soil, noise, chemicals, 
species, and landscape. Environmental policy is entrenched with technical complexities and, 
often, uncertainty about the potential effects of certain actions or substances. While law can 
be seen as a crucial tool to develop protection against deterioration of the environment, it is no 
easy matter to decide on the best form of legal instruments. What kind of regulatory tools are 
fit for a certain environmental problem? What kind of legally enforceable substantive and 
procedural rights should be given to citizens and environmental Non-governmental 
organisations?  How can we make environmental law coherent and accessible? 
Given the complexity and wideness of the whole environmental problem, the ideal of a 
clear, transparent, and easy to understand legislative package is illusionary. The complexity 
and incomprehensiveness of the EU environmental legislative package is a core concern, 
primarily for those who need to work with it in practice. In this vein, we can see the 
emergence of specialists in the field EU water law, EU climate law, and EU nature 
conservation law.
1
 This book attempts to contribute to a cross-cutting debate on EU 
environmental law by examining EU environmental legislation from a legal perspective. 
Based on the in depth discussions in the previous chapters, the following issues emerge as 
core themes to be discussed in this concluding chapter:  
- law as an instrument in order to steer towards environmental behaviour (section 2); 
- the need for a coherent law (section 3); 
- and, finally, law as a guarantee by means of enforceable rights for citizens and 
environmental non-governmental organizations, thereby providing a tool for making 
environmental legislation effective (section 4).  
These three different themes will be highlighted in the next sections, after which 
section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Law as an instrument 
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 See for a critical discussion and the need for environmental legal scholarship Fisher ao (2009) p 240-241.  
 A legal perspective on flexibility  
 
Without flexibility there could not exist a European Union. The strive to include a governance 
style into environmental directives, for which the term Governance Mode Directive has been 
used in the chapter by Van Holten and Van Rijswick, aims at providing large flexibilities to 
Member States thereby contributing to legitimacy and enabling to take into account regional 
and local circumstances. Such directives offer more flexibility by increased policy discretion 
and they contain often more procedural provisions. Von Homeyer, discussing the coexistence 
of different governance regimes within the EU, has indeed argued that EU decision-making 
regimes that strongly rely on legislation have been weakened.
2
 Van Holten and Van Rijswick 
however argue that the governance approach is not always as flexible as one might think, and 
that the differences between Classical Directives and Governance Mode Directives can be 
modest. Moreover, they warn for potential negative consequences of providing flexibility in 
EU environmental legislation, which are a potential harm to the effectiveness and the legal 
legitimacy of EU environmental legislation. Whether Governance Mode Directives will lead 
to an effective environmental protection depends on the ambitions of the Member States and 
the attitude of the courts. In that respect, Van Holten and Rijswick point at the importance of 
case law that may tell us what can really be achieved by procedural provisions. Both authors 
even warn for a deathblow of the governance approach because it will become fully 
implausible to argue that the effectiveness of environmental legislation will improve, in case 
the obligations following from environmental law will be less easy to enforce.  
An important key characteristic of environmental law is that it is often not clear what 
kind of governmental steering is necessary. For instance, in the field of adaptation to climate 
change, discussed by Keessen, one can see that there is consensus that there should be some 
planning and policy development to adequately respond to a changing climate, but at the same 
time no template can be given that would be applicable throughout the EU. As Keessen states, 
`adaptive management’ is needed, not only to deal with the increasing complexity of 
governmental tasks in the field of environmental law but also in view of the need to deal with 
uncertainty and local characteristics.  Keessen argues that this fits nicely with a procedural, 
programmatic approach that is adopted in for instance the Floods Directive (Directive 
2007/60/EC).  It appears likely that the Floods Directive will lead to assessments of flood 
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risks by Member States, but will not necessary lead to national measures to reduce flood risks. 
According to Keessen, the problem with adaptive management is that it appears to run counter 
to the mission of law to provide legal certainty and stability.  Indeed, one can even question 
whether EU environmental law by only asking Member States to map and to report, without 
prescribing substantive requirements, may feed national resistance against such laws. After 
all, it may be argued that EU legislation does nothing more than asking for reporting, mapping 
and assessing, thereby imposing huge administrative costs on Member States. A crucial and 
typical EU relevance is however that as soon as certain transboundary influences may occur, 
as is the case with transboundary waters  for which the infrastructural measures regarding the 
water management can be fine-tuned across the border, particularly in view of protecting 
states to which the river flows, there is a typical need for EU legislative action. Keessen has 
shown however that the current Floods Directive does not provide substantive protection to 
potential victim states.  
It would be false to conclude that the governance style is the common characteristic of 
EU environmental legislation. In the field of greenhouse gas emissions reductions, discussed 
by Peeters, a huge integration took place by establishing an EU wide emissions trading 
scheme that relies on a very much centralized EU decision-making procedure for the 
allocation of the tradable allowances and on rules for monitoring and enforcement, to be 
applied by Member States. While there is in this respect hardly room for maneuver for the 
Member States, there is however a large flexibility given to the industrial actors by means of 
the emissions trading regime; we qualify this as market flexibility. The private actors have the 
freedom to choose how much they are going to pollute, depending on a consideration of the 
potential price of the tradable allowances on the market and the costs for avoiding emissions. 
This has added another ‘governance’ approach, this time a market based governance 
approach, to current ones, thereby not replacing existing ones.
3
 As Peeters argues, the use of 
this type of governance by means of emissions trading has to be backed up by sound 
monitoring and enforcement. In this sense, under the assumption that Member States monitor 
and enforce the rules that establish the greenhouse gas allowance market, the given flexibility 
towards operators should not endanger the environmental effectiveness of the Directive. As 
Peeters has discussed, however, the EU has chosen to introduce complementary instruments 
to the EU Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Schemes particularly the Renewable Energy 
Directive (2009/28/EC) and the Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU). Hence, while the 
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ambition of the Directive for greenhouse gas emissions trading can be debated, other 
instruments have been introduced that at least partly pursue the same goal: the reduction of 
greenhouse gases. This policy mix introduced on the EU level requires Member States to 
develop many different actions in order to reach compliance. Particularly the Renewable 
Energy Directive leaves therewith considerable choice to the Member States: they need to 
develop support schemes and administrative procedures in order to comply with the imposed 
renewable energy target. Peeters questions whether the introduction of a number of 
instruments is really necessary and she points at the problem for Member States to implement 
all those laws. In that sense, the instrument mix hence may endanger the effectiveness of EU 
climate and energy law. 
Next to the development of new governance approaches within directives, there is also 
an emerging practice of strategies outside the legal framework of Directives. As Bogaart has 
shown, the Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) takes place entirely outside the legal 
framework of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and concerns a cooperation of 
the Commission and public and private actors, among which stakeholders and experts.  
Because of this cooperation between different levels of governance, the CIS is generally 
considered as an important new governance form.  CIS provides for a platform for sharing 
experiences and for mutual learning and its main objective is to allow, as far as possible, a 
coherent and harmonious implementation of the WFD. The most important activity of this 
network is the development of guidance documents. Bogaart argues that it is imaginable that 
they contain far-reaching requirements. Therefore, although soft law, they may be an 
important factor in the ultimate environmental effect that can be achieved by the Water 
Framework Directive. 
On balance, EU environmental legislation contains a wide variety of steering 
approaches, roughly varying from Classical to Governance Mode to Market Based. The 
crucial characteristic here is that EU environmental legislation is mostly about imposing 
obligations on nation states, and that Member States may feel the need to keep discretion 
themselves.  As a result of this, flexibility for Member States can be found in a very nuanced 
way through different provisions.  This leads us to conclude that there is a need to develop 
taxonomy of the different steering types in order to show in a more theoretical way which 
different styles are embedded in EU environmental legislation. The legal consequences of 
these different steering styles can then also be better examined. Such a comprehensive study 
could also disclose whether there is more flexibility than integration in EU environmental 
legislation. Governance and flexibility may however never be an excuse for less ambitious 
environmental laws, and there is a need to keep a critical eye on the achievement of the 
central aim of EU environmental law, which is the achievement of a high level of 
environmental protection. 
 
Instrument choice 
Despite the discussion on flexibility, one can also notice that in several EU environmental 
directives regulatory tools are being prescribed that have to be applied by Member States 
towards polluters. In this respect, many different regulatory instruments are being used in EU 
environmental legislation, ranging from classic control and command approaches to market 
based instruments and communication instruments, like labelling. All these regulatory 
approaches have their own specific characteristics and potential legal problems. This 
diversified “instrument package” is a core characteristic of EU law. This can be clearly 
illustrated with the EU greenhouse gas emissions trading instrument (discussed by Peeters)  
and the integrated environmental permit (discussed by Oosterhuis and Peeters).  The IPPC-
directive (2008/1/EC) requires a “command and control” regulatory instrument by means of 
integrated permit linked to a best available technology requirement. This regulatory approach, 
prolonged by the Industrial Emissions Directive (2010/75/EU), starts from the idea that 
throughout the EU the same technical standard should be applied, which is contrary to an 
economic perspective that would argue that fine-tuning is needed in order to choose optimal 
approaches that would reach an overall economic benefit. On the other hand, the most far 
going market based approach, the EU emissions trading scheme, has met quite some criticism 
and hence can also not be seen as the super model for the regulation of emissions. One can 
hence easily conclude that the choice of the right regulatory instrument in order to steer 
polluting behaviour is still a challenge. Oosterhuis and Peeters have recommended that more 
empirical data are needed in order to be able to assess the performance of for instance the 
integrated permit idea. More evidence is needed to answer the question of whether the best 
available technology approach really reaches the aim of an integrated approach (in the sense 
of environmental integration), and to what extent case-specific considerations are to be made 
by the permitting authorities in order to fulfill the ultimate aim of the protection of the 
environment as a whole. They even question the concept of environmental integration as 
such: to what extent is that really reachable and beneficial in practice?  
As Fisher and others have stressed, law should not be viewed as a “plug and play” 
instrument and the functioning and effectiveness of environmental legislation can only be 
understood on the basis of an analysis of its wider legal context thereby examining the 
specific legal institutions, competences and principles.
4
 The choice of regulatory instruments 
cannot be seen as a technocratic exercise taken place in a clean clinic. EU environmental 
legislation is in this respect also an expression of changing views on how to govern in Europe. 
In case where the Governance Mode Directive is being employed, the instrument choice is 
often left to the Member States, while with the more classical directives the regulatory tools 
are to quite some extent being decided on the EU level.  
Groothuijse and Uylenburg investigate in their contribution the flexibility of EU 
directives by looking at the freedom for Member States to make regulatory choices, 
particularly the choice for a programmed approach to achieve environmental quality standards 
laid down in EU directives. In a programmed approach, measures aimed at reaching the 
standards on the one hand and economic developments on the other hand, are balanced. With 
this approach it is possible to allow polluting activities as long as it is assured that the 
environmental quality standard is achieved at the end of the given term. It is not surprising 
that when a Directive leaves the choice of instruments to the Member States a programmed 
approach is preferred. The authors show that when a directive requires having source-based 
instruments in place, like permissions with emission limit values based on best available 
techniques, a programmed approach is in fact supported by a link made between the source 
based instruments and the environmental quality standard laid down in the EU-directive. This 
means that the achievement of an EQS should be linked to a plan or programme and not to the 
case-based permissions of separate projects. They furthermore conclude that a programmed 
approach is supported by EU directives in which clear and harsh deadlines are given for 
achieving the EQS. The way the programmatic approach is legally established in the Water 
Framework Directive could be used as a model for future EU and national legislation aimed at 
the achievement of EQSs. 
 
 
Competences and flexibility 
Finally, we observe an interesting relationship between on the one hand the competence for 
adopting EU environmental legislation and on the other hand the amount of flexibility 
included into the adopted regulatory measure. The environmental competence of the EU 
originates from the Single European Act from 1987 and has developed via the Maastricht 
Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty into a broad competence to adopt 
environmental measures along the ordinary procedure with consultation of the Economic and 
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Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Particularly after the Maastricht Treaty 
that introduced qualified majority voting in the Council a shift took place from the internal 
market competence to the environmental law competence, now article 192 TFEU. 
5
  
Following Article 192(2) TFEU, the Council can only decide with unanimity on some 
specified topics, together with a consultation of the Parliament. Interestingly, the legal basis 
for environmental decision-making can have an impact on the discretion left to Member 
States. An example in this respect is article 194 TFEU, from which follows that measures that 
for instance promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and 
renewable forms of energy shall not affect a Member State’s right to determine the conditions 
for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the 
general structure of its energy supply, without prejudice to article 192(2)(c) TFEU. This 
basically means that EU measures based on article 194 TFEU should leave full discretion 
towards the Member States on these issues, unless the measure can be based on Article 192(2) 
TFEU. One can hence say that the competence description of article 194 ensures discretion of 
Member States. Also in case of Article 192(2) – that prescribed unanimity voting in the 
Council - flexibility for Member States seems to be ensured. The requirement of unanimity 
voting in the Council entails that a Member State can ask for a lot of discretion and flexibility 
to be part of the EU legislation, knowing that it otherwise would veto the directive.  
 
3. Coherency  
 
Coherency and internal integration 
As soon as multiple regulatory instruments are introduced in order to achieve the ultimate 
goal of a high level of environmental protection, the question of coherency emerges. 
Coherency is needed in order to avoid conflicts between several regulatory approaches, and to 
avoid uncertainty on the applicability of specific provisions. The strive towards coherency is 
moreover important in order to achieve an integrated approach towards the protection of the 
ecosystem. The aim to undertake an integrated approach for achieving a high level of 
environmental protection has not been prescribed by the TFEU. Oosterhuis and Peeters have 
discussed that case law of the ECJ (now the CJEU) made clear that integration is not an 
absolute aim to pursue, and that the adoption of measures relating solely to certain specified 
aspects of the environment is allowed, provided that such measures contribute to the 
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preservation, protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. According to 
Oosterhuis and Peeters, it will be hard to request trough the court a more integrated 
environmental legislation. Hence, there is a relatively large freedom for the EU legislature to 
decide on how to achieve internal integration within the law. In terms of Member States’ 
obligations, however, Van Kempen has pointed at case law of the CJEU where, in the course 
of the assessment of the question whether Ireland failed to implement the Birds Directive 
(Directive 79/409/EEC, now 2009/147/EC) the Court has referred to the need of getting a 
`coherent whole’.6 In this specific case, it was found insufficient if a Member State takes 
several partial, isolated measures not all of which are actually meant to achieve the result of 
the obligation as prescribed by the Directive. In conclusion, it is clear that a Directive can 
prescribe a Member State that it has to pursue coherency in its implementation measures, and 
when it does, the Court may test according to this aim whether the implementation of the 
Directive is correct. 
 
Comprehensive law system  
Beijen clearly attempts to provide means for improving the coherency of EU environmental 
law. She states that EU secondary law does not form a comprehensive system of 
environmental law and she argues that fine-tuning of terminology is a powerful tool in order 
to achieve coherency of the law. In this vein, she explores whether the development of an 
Environmental Framework Directive would be an optimal form of reaching coherency of 
terminology.  She doesn’t go that far that she proposes a Regulation, which would prevent 
problems concerning implementation and would avoid differences between Member States. In 
her opinion, it is important that the key terms  have to be implemented into the national legal 
systems and that Member States keep discretion to fit them within their own legal system. A 
Directive better suits these requirements. Practical research towards national environmental 
legislation can show to what extent such discretion is needed or wished for by Member States. 
Some countries have already an Environmental Code (France, Sweden, The Netherlands) 
while other countries have a more sectoral environmental legislative package (Germany). It 
will be interesting to study whether a Common EU Environmental Law terminology requires 
amendments of national legislation. It is not excluded that Member States will move to static 
references to the terminology in the Directive. There might be a legal reason for Member 
States to follow precisely the definitions of the Environmental Framework Directive, since if 
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a national oriented definition will be chosen there might be a risk of not having implemented 
the Directive in a correct way.  
Beijen claims that the Environmental Framework Directive should contain definitions 
of core terms. This terminology should then be used in all other (new) European 
environmental legislation, for example when revising existing Directives. In the course of 
developing the Environmental Framework  Directive, it needs to be decided exactly which 
terms will be codified. Should for instance the term “environment” be defined, and should the 
definition then be exhaustive or non-exhaustive?
7
 Another question is to what extent common 
definitions are possible: the greenhouse gas permit applied in the EU Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Trading Scheme is of a very different character than the permit prescribed by the 
Industrial Emissions Directive. Furthermore, one can wonder whether the definition of a 
permit in the sphere of environmental law will also be useful for the use of this term in other 
fields of EU law. Nonetheless, the debate that has been launched by Beijen regarding the 
option of an Environmental Framework Directive is extremely interesting. Further study and 
even a moot exercise for developing such a draft Environmental Framework Directive 
including a review of its consequences for terminology in national environmental legislation 
will most likely be contributive to the coherency of EU environmental law.  
Also Oosterhuis and Peeters, discussing internal integration, have pointed at a lack of 
clarity of the term `integration’. This term represents the core purpose of the IPPC and IE 
Directive, but has not been defined in the legislative texts. Also the term `environment’ has 
not been defined in the EU Treaties nor in the IPPC or IE Directive, although there is an 
indication that the integrated approach mainly has to focus on emissions into air, water and 
soil, to waste management, to energy efficiency and to accident prevention.
8
 On the other 
hand, the IE Directive uses the term “the environment as a whole” which raises the question 
what is covered by that.
9
 Such questions regarding the meaning of core terms complicates 
judicial control on the substantive application by the permitting authorities. Neither the IPPC 
nor the IE directive provide clear legal standards against which it can be assessed whether or 
not integration has been achieved. If a legal requirement is vague, judicial enforcement stays 
necessarily weak compared to detailed legal obligations. This does not only mean that 
national courts are limited in testing the national permits against the core aim of the IPPC 
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directive and IE directive, it also means that the Commission is limited in enforcing a 
substantive integrated approach through the infringement procedure. 
Beijen does not limit the purpose of the  Environmental Framework Directive to 
definitions of terms only. Instruments, such as environmental quality standards, are used in 
different environmental fields and deserve also, in her view, a common approach by laying it 
down in the Environmental Framework Directive. When thinking of an Environmental 
Framework Directive, it would also be interesting to develop a taxonomy of obligations that 
Directives impose on Member States. Van Kempen states that although it was one of the aims 
of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) to streamline European water legislation by 
repealing several old directives and thus creating a clearer set of rules for Member States, 
complexity has instead not been removed. He points at the fact that this is particularly caused 
because of a lack of clarity of concepts and terms. This means, in the words of Van Kempen, 
that the single obligation to achieve good water status is actually only the tip of an iceberg 
that is by itself very difficult to grasp. In order to gain a clear understanding of what is legally 
obliged, Van Kempen has analysed the difference between obligations of best effort and 
obligations of result and he has proposed to use clear definitions since it only then becomes 
clear what the real legal obligation of a Member States is. He argues that Member States 
might intend to interpret a certain provision as an obligation of best effort, and not of result, 
thereby trying to follow the least onerous obligation. The fact that the Court has not yet been 
addressed to provide clarity on this matter with regards to the Water Framework Directive 
enables such strategic interpretations in practice. In his study he has developed a methodology 
based on the case law of the CJEU in view of other (and older) directives in order to 
understand the definition of and difference between obligations of result and best effort. The 
first type of obligations are provisions in directives that require Member States to obtain very 
precise and specific results after a certain period. Obligations of best effort however are 
provisions that require Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure that certain 
objectives formulated in general and unquantifiable terms are attained, whilst leaving them 
some discretion as to the nature of the measures to be taken.  In other words: both types intend 
to achieve a result, but an obligation of best efforts requires one to endeavour or do one’s best 
to attain it, whereas an obligation of result requires one to succeed in attaining that result. In 
the case of an obligation of best effort, Member States are obliged to do whatever is 
reasonably possible. In the case of an obligation of result, Member States have to do all that is 
in fact possible to achieve the goal of the obligation.  It is however not necessarily true that 
obligations of result are always more difficult to comply with than obligations of best efforts. 
Reasonableness also plays a role concerning obligations of result, since it is incorporated into 
the exemptions typically listed in the directives themselves. Van Kempen even argues that an 
obligation of best efforts without any exemptions listed in the directive could be more 
burdensome for a Member State than an obligation of result with very generous exemptions. 
Obligations of best efforts do give some room for Member States to come up with their own 
tailor-made excuses, because they are not restricted to a limited set. It is, however, not at all 
guaranteed that the courts will be generous in accepting these ad hoc justifications, whereas 
they would be obliged to do so if these exemptions were listed in the directive. Finally, Van 
Kempen recommends to use a structured qualification method in order to increase the clarity 
of rules, not only those of the Water Framework Directive but also of other environmental 
directives. It would be interesting to conduct such a research, based on Van Kempen’s 
methodology, regarding other environmental directives after which can be concluded whether 
indeed a common terminology can be provided, which then ideally can be put into the 
Environmental Framework Directive proposed by Barbara Beijen.  
 
Coherency by coordination 
Peeters and Oosterhuis discuss the coherency of directives in view of the co-ordination 
between the regulation of general industrial emissions and the specific regulation of 
greenhouse gas emissions. With the adoption of the Directive on greenhouse gas emissions 
trading a provision has been introduced meaning that the integrated permit as being required 
by the IPPC Directive may not include an emission limit value for greenhouse gas emissions. 
The rationale for this rule is that the functioning of the emissions trading instrument, and 
hence the freedom of operators to decide whether to reduce emissions or to buy allowances, 
should not be frustrated by “command and control” emission limits imposed by the IPPC 
permit. The authors however point at the fact that for energy efficiency, it is a free choice for 
Member States whether or not to include requirements into the integrated permit. It is 
however not clear whether the use of energy still may play a role with integrated assessment 
leading to the determination of inter alia a water or air emission limit value. Particularly when 
a Member States has decided to make use of the possibility not to adopt energy efficiency 
measures into the IPPC or IED permit, the question whether the permitting authority is still 
competent to take account of energy issues when defining the emissions limit values could be 
part of a legal dispute. Given the explicit emphasis in the IE directive on energy efficiency 
being part of an integrated approach, they argue that energy considerations should play a role 
when determining the specific emission limit value for an installation. This specific example 
again illustrates what kind of legal questions can emerge if the co-ordination between 
directives is not clearly regulated.  
The way how to develop a coherent set of rules for the environmental domain is still a 
question that has to be answered. The problem of reaching coherency and internal integration 
are not typical EU environmental law problems, but will rise in any legal system where 
environmental protection is tried to be achieved through law. Particularly International 
Environmental Law is largely characterized by its fragmentation: the amount of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements is enormous and fine-tuning of terminology but also provisions 
largely lacks. Political scientists however will argue that a modest fragmentation is not always 
bad and can even have some benefits.
10
 In case of EU secondary environmental legislation, 
the typical legal point of view, as presented by Beijen, is that laws have to be coordinated in 
order to avoid conflict of norms, and that the meaning of terms should be as clear as possible. 
However, as soon as such secondary environmental legislation deliberately allows Member 
States to introduce different regulatory options, as is for example the case with the Framework 
Directives, fragmentation of law is even accepted as a wishful phenomenon, also in view of 
subsidiarity. To put it differently: EU environmental legislation should be as coherent as 
possible, but as soon as for reasons of governance flexibility is allowed for Member States, 
fragmentation is even seen as a positive point, facilitating better solutions in a certain area. 
The adoption of several laws in Member States can however lead to problems for private 
actors that pursue activities in different Member States. When we for instance take large 
energy companies that pursue activities in several Member States, such energy companies will 
have to deal with different support mechanisms and administrative procedures for renewable 
energy across Member States. The flexibility left to Member States hence goes hand in hand 
with larger costs for industries that operate in more than one Member State. The integration of 
law on the EU level would avoid that problem, but then again the possibility for reaching 
optimal solutions given the specific circumstances of a Member States would be reduced. 
After all, the debate on comprehensiveness, internal integration and fragmentation shows how 
challenging the design of a coherent environmental law is. Lawyers can nevertheless 
contribute to the effort to make the law as coherent as possible. At the same time, coherency 
is not the ultimate ideal to reach, but the adequacy of the law, particularly in terms of 
environmental protection but also in view of a justified treatment of private actors. If all 
polluters would be treated in the same way, this might run counter to the principle of equal 
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treatment. Hence, different situations may ask for differential treatment, which contributes to 
the complexity of the law. 
 
 
 
Framework Directives 
 
Bogaart conducted an in depth examination of the meaning of the term `Framework 
Directive’. In that sense she contributes to the wish from Beijen to develop a clear and 
coherent terminology in EU environmental law. The term `Framework Directive’ does not 
appear in the Treaties and a standard definition doesn’t exist. Bogaart argues that the typical 
characteristic of Framework Directives is that the standard-setting is left to Member States. 
She proposes to reserve the term Framework Directive for flexible directives with a general 
character, which at least for a large part lay down open-ended standards and procedural rules 
on the implementation of the standards. In view of this definition, Bogaart argues that a 
Framework directive cannot be used to regulate air pollution, since human health necessitates 
a uniform approach across the EU that guarantees at least a safe environment by setting 
minimum air quality standards. The Air Quality Directive (2008/50/EC) can in her view not 
be qualified as a Framework Directive since  Member States have virtually no room for 
discretion regarding standard setting. The Framework Directive in the definition proposed by 
Bogaart come close to the Governance Mode Directive as being discussed by Van Holten and 
Van Rijswick, but the latter term is broader, since it focuses on the question whether the 
Directive tries to enable flexibility, also in view of reaching environmental standards set by 
the Directive. The latter authors hence discuss in their chapter whether the advantages of 
including a governance style will be achieved, thereby applying a legal perspective, while 
Bogaart tries to come up with a definition of the Framework Directive. According to Bogaart, 
the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (2008/56/EC) in any case rightly deserves the title 
framework directive, since objectives must be totally fleshed out at the regional level. The 
Water Framework Directive, on the other hand, seems to combine characteristics of a 
framework directive with a normal directive, since it lays down EU-wide chemical objectives 
(‘normal directive’), leaving the setting of the ecological objectives for the lower level 
(‘framework directive’).  Consequently, Bogaart is against the use of the term ‘framework 
directive’ for directives that only have a broad scope, and she also argues that policy freedom 
regarding the type of measures needed  in order to achieve the goals cannot be regarded as a 
distinctive characteristic of a Framework Directive. In this sense, for instance, the Renewable 
Energy Directive, discussed by Peeters, cannot be seen as a Framework Directive since the 
ultimate target, the amount of renewable energy to be consumed in 2020, is defined in the 
Directive. Interestingly, however, Member States are free to decide how to distribute this 
target among different sectors (electricity, heating and cooling, and transport), for which 
specific policy targets have to be notified to the Commission (article 4 Renewable Energy 
Directive). Consequently, the setting of sub-objectives needs to be done by the Member 
States, which, as one might argue, turns the Renewable Energy directive as far as that aspect 
is concerned into a kind of Framework directive. This example shows again how complicated 
it is to develop a good taxonomy in EU environmental law. Non-lawyers may find the 
discussion on what exactly is a Framework directive as rather theoretical and not contributing 
to a better environmental policy. Lawyers, however, adhere to trying to use the best 
terminology possible in order to have a high quality law that is as easy as possible to 
understand. Since Environmental Law is already, given its difficult substance matter and 
broad scope, a complex field of law, a clear use of terminology is in that sense to be 
recommended.  The attempt of Bogaart to classify what a Framework Directive exactly is 
deserves in this respect appreciation, and the right terminology is of course open for further 
academic and political debate.  
 
Coherency and new legislative provisions  
Environmental law is far from a static field of law. When new problems arrive, the option of 
new environmental laws in order to address these problems will be considered and in the 
course of this, the need for coherency with the existing package needs to be considered.  
This is illustrated in the contribution of Vogelezang-Stoute focussing on the EU 
regulatory approach towards nanomaterials. She addresses the `technology control dilemma’ 
which deals with the question of how to govern the emergence of a new technology which by 
definition cannot be fully characterized with respect to its potential benefits and drawbacks. 
She points out that new technologies raise chances to promote research and industrial 
innovation promoting benefits to society, but also raise challenges as to how integrate health, 
safety and environmental protection in the regulation. She presented three approaches to 
regulate the uncertainties of new technologies: an incremental approach, a nano-specific 
approach  and a precautionary approach. An incremental approach implies that existing 
legislative structures are used to regulate the new technology. A product-specific approach 
will require more attention for coherency than an incremental approach. A precautionary 
approach means a comprehensive and in depth balancing of the opportunities and risk of the 
new technology. This approach comes with barriers, like the costs of legislative changes and 
the burden that this implies for authorities and companies. The author does not indicate which 
approach she prefers for specifically nanomaterials, but makes clear that despite the fact that 
an incremental approach was firmly promoted by the EU Commission in 2004, substantive 
regulatory answers for governing the emerging technology have not yet been provided. She 
points at the need to have at least information requirements on exposure and risk, preferably 
by means of a public register, after which next steps for governing the uncertain risks can be 
developed. 
Also in the field of adaptation to climate change, the question of new legislative 
strategies needs to be addressed. Keessen argues that a nuanced assessment has to be 
conducted meaning that the need for mainstreaming or even integrating adaptation policies 
into other EU policies depends on the impacts of climate change on a specific sector and the 
role of the EU in that sector. Here again lies a relationship with the competences: after all, 
what the EU can do to mainstream adaptation depends on its competence to act. Fine-tuning 
of new adaptation provisions with existing EU legislation is relatively uncomplicated when 
adaptation to climate change is in line with the policy goals of that EU legislation. She argues 
that it is also possible that mainstreaming takes place by inserting adaptation provisions into 
legislation made for other purposes, but she points at the fact that the specific competence of 
the EU in the specific policy field need to be considered.  For instance in the field of health, 
the EU is only competent to take supplementary action, and hence the adaptation provisions 
need to stay limited in that respect as well. In case of environmental law, however, the 
adaptation provisions seem to fall easily within the competence reach. Adaptation efforts can 
fall within the aims of Article 192(1) in view of the protection of the environment, human 
health and to promote sustainable use of natural resources. She also argues that a potential 
Adaptation Directive should not be used as a mainstreaming instrument, but could be used as 
a  supplement to mainstreaming by adapting existing law. Keessen, however, points 
realistically to the fact that if the EU opts for mainstreaming where possible, this entails 
amending Directives and Regulations which is a complicated and time-consuming process. 
 
Coherency and instrument choice  
In contrast to the rise of Directives that try to bring all relevant legislation in one domain 
together (like the Water Framework Directive) and to integrated permitting, an almost 
incomprehensible package of laws has been established in the field of climate and energy with 
moreover remarkable and not necessarily beneficial interplays between the instruments. 
Peeters critically discusses whether the EU has adopted  an appropriate instrument mix, or is 
in fact applying an instrument mess.
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 Reducing the instruments applied at the EU level 
would lead to more coherency, simply by using less rules. The ambition towards climate 
protection can be assured by imposing strict caps under the EU Greenhouse Gas emissions 
trading scheme and the Effort Sharing Decision (Decision 406/2009). If carbon emissions get 
a price, renewable energy and energy efficiency measures will become more favorable, and 
less regulatory instruments are needed. 
 
4. Rights and their contribution to the Effectiveness of Environmental Legislation   
 
Direct effect of substantive provisions  
The trend towards including governance modes in Directives leads to less substantive rules in 
EU environmental legislation. While citizens and particularly Environmental Non 
Governmental Organizations can try to influence environmental protection through public 
participation rights they are provided with less tools to enforce environmental protection. In 
other terms, EU environmental law is not largely characterized by the conferral of substantive 
environmental rights upon citizens. Bogaart has discussed that the most important 
characteristic of Framework Directives is that the ecological objectives are set at the national 
or regional level. This approach obviously means that substantive directive provisions are 
often not precise and unconditional and as a result do not produce direct effect. On the other 
hand, as Bogaart has shown, a Framework directive –at least in the way how she defines it - 
cannot be used to regulate air pollution, since human health necessitates a uniform approach 
across the EU that guarantees at least a safe environment, not causing diseases or worse. 
Given the objectives of EU environmental law laid down in Article 191 TFEU, EU 
environmental legislation has at least to provide such protection that human health and the 
important values of the ecosystem are preserved. Whether that minimum level actually is 
reached – at least on paper, in view of the content of EU environmental legislation - deserves 
empirical evaluation by environmental scientists.  
However, depending on the problem to be regulated, enforceable rights are not always 
provided to citizens. Vogelezang-Stoute has shown the lack of basic information on exposure 
and risk coming from nanomaterials. Notification, including information on basic research 
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data, and a public register should be basic provisions regarding the regulation of 
nanomaterials, thereby enabling consumers to make informed choices. Vogelezang-Stoute 
argues that that more transparency can be a basis for next governmental steps. Also Keessen 
discussed information requirements and she argues that the requirements from the Floods 
Directive  may succeed in obliging the Member States to assess flood risks and create maps 
and plans, but this will probably not result in State measures to reduce flood risks. The Floods 
Directive does no more than ensuring that they have the opportunity to know the flood risks. 
Although the Floods Directive states that flood risk plans have to include measures to achieve 
the objectives, it does not oblige Member States to arrive at a certain level of flood safety. 
Keessen shows that the position of citizens with regard to flood risks is even worse compared 
to Janecek which concerned enforcing compliance with given  EU air quality standards. 
Citizens who live in flood prone areas do not have an EU standard of acceptable flood risk to 
rely on. Also in a broader sense regarding adaptation provisions in EU legislation, Keessen 
foresees that citizens might only be entitled to information and participation in the 
establishment of adaptation plans and not to the achievement of concrete results, such as a 
reduction of flood risks or the urban heat island effect. 
Since the problem of adaptation is new and the real climate change effects in a certain 
area are hard to predict, a flexible and procedural approach seems to be preferred. One can 
here however expect that the gap that these flexible approaches leave regarding adequate 
protection for citizens may be filled in, at least partly, by human rights. Particularly for 
instance where floods, heat waves and landslides could threat the life and well-being of 
citizens Member States have to respect the ECHR rights.
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Van Holten and van Rijswick have provided interesting insight into the legal 
protection given by a traditional Directive, an in-between Directive and a Governance Mode 
Directive. They argue that effectiveness of European environmental law is not only achieved 
by increasing input legitimacy, but also by increasing effective legal protection. For the latter, 
the concept of direct effect and hence the use of unconditional and sufficiently precise terms 
is in that respect of great importance. Governance Mode Directives aim at giving provisions 
which give a high level of discretion to Member States, and, consequently, such provisions 
are then consequently not ‘unconditional and sufficiently precise’. In that case individuals can 
only rely directly on the limits of the discretion of the Member State, as set by the provision, 
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in national court. As case law has taught, these limits have to be sufficiently precise in order 
to invoke direct effect.  
 
Complexity, clarity and effectiveness 
Both complexity of European environmental law and lack of clarity can have their 
consequences for the effectiveness of law. Van Kempen argues that European environmental 
law has become increasingly complex and at times lacks the clarity to allow for effective 
implementation and thus effective environmental protection. He points at the fact that 
situations emerge in which Member States do not know what exactly they are obliged to do. 
Particularly regarding clarity he focuses on the potential obscurity of the legal status of 
directive provisions: are they obligations of best efforts or obligations of result? He examines 
this, as a case based study, on the basis of the Water Framework Directive. This Directive has 
introduced new obligations and standards regarding ecological quality, and for instance its 
article 4 is according to Van Kempen notoriously complex. The wording deviates from older 
environmental directives, leaving its interpretation even more unclear. His chapter shows that 
confusion about terminology, already discussed in section 3 of this chapter, threatens the 
effectiveness of the law. 
While Van Kempen takes an in depth discussion of the provisions of one Directive, 
even focusing on one Article of that Directive, Peeters has discussed the problem of executing 
a set of different regulatory instruments in one environmental field, that of climate and 
energy. The establishment of many laws that ask for intense governmental action in order to 
conduct inter alia permit systems, support mechanisms, and monitoring and enforcement may 
entail the risk that difficulties emerge with the execution of the climate and energy laws. A 
simpler instrument approach seems more effective. In that sense, she proposes to examine 
whether a more inclusive approach can be developed in the EU by means of an ambitious 
carbon market that includes all carbon emitters. The benefit would be that the amount of 
instruments can be reduced, and that the administrative execution of climate law will be 
simplified, and core tasks, like monitoring and enforcement, can be better executed. 
  
 
Discretion and procedural rights  
It would however be short-sighted if the legal discussion would only be concentrated on the 
wish for clear defined substantive rights. Van Holten and Van Rijswick point at the fact that 
involvement of the members of the public in the course of standard-setting or the design of 
measures to reach such standards can significantly increase the public backing of European 
environmental law. In this sense, Governance Mode Directives that require extensive public 
participation can contribute to so called input-legitimacy. However, these authors rightly state 
that public participation cannot only be contributed to governance. Participation is a basic 
principle in environmental law since the adoption of the Aarhus Convention and is one of the 
principles of good governance. In this sense, procedural rights have become a fundamental 
layer of EU environmental legislation, and further debate is needed on the actual design and 
application of these rights both on the EU and national level. However, as may be clear, as 
soon as particularly substantive environmental provisions lack in EU environmental 
legislation, procedural rights are extremely important, particularly when Member States have 
to set standards for environmental protection. Empirical research towards the influence of the 
use of procedural rights towards the level of environmental ambition in national decisions has 
to show what the real role of these rights is. 
 
Equal Treatment 
Some contributions have pointed at the legal principle of equal treatment. Peeters discusses 
the consideration of the Court of Justice of the EU to put all greenhouse gas emitters on the 
same footing: they are all to be seen as polluters.
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 This does not mean that differential 
approaches cannot be applied by the EU legislator but such differentiation needs to be based 
on objective and transparent criteria. Hence, based on objective reasons, some industries may 
have higher burdens than others. One could even imagine that a legislator would differentiate 
among necessary and luxury emissions, meaning that the latter would be treated more 
severely. The starting point, however, should be that all greenhouse gas emitters should be 
included in the regulatory framework. The legal debate will then focus on the question who 
has to pay how much. The principle of equal treatment, to which is inherent that different 
situations should not be treated equally unless this can be justified, is then a legal reason why 
still some fragmentation has to take place in the regulatory approach. Also in view of the 
IPPC and IE directive equal treatment considerations pop up, particularly in view of applying 
the same technological standards to an industrial sector across the EU. Oosterhuis and Peeters 
comment upon the alignment of environmental performance requirements for industrial 
installations, and state that  market integration by means of a level playing field has become 
part of the integrated permitting approach, which not necessarily means that an optimal 
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environmental integrative approach is being reached. They point at the fact that case-specific 
assessments by permitting authorities may enable the determination of optimal solutions for 
environmental protection (which can serve as justification for differential treatment) but also 
acknowledge that more discretion for permitting authorities may lead to bargaining processes 
on the individual level. Procedural rights, as just discussed, but also inspection mechanisms 
towards the functioning of permitting authorities may be useful provisions to counterbalance 
that threat.  
Van Holten and Van Rijswick finally discuss equal treatment from the perspective of 
citizens. They argue that legitimacy enables equality, particularly regarding the same 
minimum of environmental protection level for all EU citizens. By laying down substantive 
minimum standards equal treatment of EU citizens in terms of living in a sound environment 
can be ensured, of course under the condition that citizens have the possibility to address the 
court.  
 
5. Final conclusion 
 
Reviewing the themes that emerge from the chapters to this book, a few final observations can 
be made. First of all, it is confirmed that lawyers like to discuss about text and terminology. 
This explains why ample attention has been given towards developing more coherency across 
EU environmental law, particularly by means of developing a common terminology.  
Furthermore, the preference of lawyers for legal certainty explains the critical approach 
towards the governance style by Van Holten and Van Rijswick after having examined the 
legal effectiveness of provisions in Governance Mode Directives by testing them on their 
potential direct effect. However, the discussions also show that the contributing authors 
realise that EU environmental law cannot follow a top down approach where all terms and 
provisions are prescribed in a detailed and clear way. Given the special character of the EU, 
that basically unites different legal systems from nation states with different economies, the 
option of leaving discretion to Member States should not be excluded and is in fact in the 
heart of EU environmental legislation. Hence, lawyers studying EU environmental law need 
to balance between on the one hand their wish for clear EU environmental legislation that 
avoids interpretation problems with preferably where possible providing enforceable 
substantive rights to citizens, with on the other hand the values embedded into the subsidiarity 
and proportionality principle. These principles contribute to the Governance Mode where it is 
aimed to find solutions on national levels and even sub national levels where democratic 
decision-making and moreover the engagement of citizens and Environmental Organisations 
have to play a role for increasing legitimacy and providing fine-tuned and adequate solutions.  
In this book, and also in this concluding chapter, we have tried to stay modest in our 
attempt to get a better understanding of the legal quality of EU environmental legislation and 
to further environmental law scholarship.  The complexity of EU environmental law makes a 
comprehensive discussion of its quality and performance very difficult. Already single issues 
like the meaning and application of the precautionary principle, the concept of direct effect, 
the value, design and application of emissions trading, and the value and design of public 
participation procedures or access to environmental information, have been discussed in 
numerous articles and books.  While it has become already difficult to become an expert in for 
example EU climate and energy law or EU nature conservation law, it is almost impossible to 
come to full grips with the whole area of EU environmental legislation. We hence have put 
forward observations and idea’s, all based on the wish that EU citizens may live in a beautiful 
and sound environment. 
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